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THE CASE OF CHRISTMAS ISLAND:
HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW AFFECTS
THE AUSTRALIAN-MALAYSIAN
REFUGEE DEAL
Ria Pereira
INTRODUCTION
In July of 2011, Australia and Malaysia entered an
arrangement in which Australian asylum seekers would be removed
to neighboring Malaysia to have their asylum claims processed.1
Following widespread criticism in the media, Australia’s High Court
(“High Court” or “Court”) ruled that such a deal violated Australia’s
refuges protection laws.2 While this ruling should have put an end to
the deal, Australia’s Immigration Minister, Chris Bowen, indicated
that the agreement might nevertheless be feasible.3 Policy makers


J.D. Candidate, 2013, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State

University.
See Matt Siegel, Plan to Deal With Seekers of Asylum Roils Australia, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, at A7.
2 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32 (Austl.); British Broadcasting
Corporation, Australia Court Rules Out Refugee ‘Swap’ with Malaysia, BBC NEWS, Aug.
31, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14727471; Crystal Ja &
Julian Drape, Opponents Demand Government Rule Out Malaysia Deal, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Sept. 7, 2011, http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-newsnational/oppn-demands-govt-rule-out-malaysia-deal-20110907-1jwh4.html.
3 See Madeleine Coorey, Australia’s Malaysia Refugee Swap Under Fire, AFP,
Sept. 16, 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g—
1
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proposed amending Australian domestic immigration laws to allow
the deal to go forward unencumbered; and a bill to amend Australia’s
Migration Act was subsequently introduced.4
This comment addresses the conflict and interplay between
Australia’s internal laws and its international obligations. Part I of this
comment describes the origin and structure of the Malaysian refugee
deal.5 The existing legality of the third party schemes under
Australia’s current immigration system is then examined in Part II. 6
The High Court has not only expounded on third party schemes in
general, but has also ruled on the legality of the 2011 Malaysian deal.
The High Court’s holding and rationale is taken up in Part III.7 Given
Australia’s international obligations as a State Party to the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee
Convention” or “Convention”), Part IV and V will then explore the
wrongfulness of such a deal under standards of international law and
effective protection.8 To further this analysis, Part VI will examine
Malaysia’s treatment of refugees.9 As it currently stands, Australian
law and international obligations are in agreement: the Malaysian deal
would be improper. However, officials within the Australian
government propose disrupting this synchronicity by amending the
country’s internal laws to allow for such a deal. It is thus necessary to
look at how these two bodies of governance work in synergy. Part
VII addresses whether amending Australia’s Migration Act would
fulfill the country’s international obligations.10
The deal has significance for both Australia and the
international community. The Australian government’s continued
insistence of the deal’s legality, despite the High Court’s ruling,
presents a challenge to future asylum seekers in Australia. On a
broader scale, the deal raises a question regarding the interplay
d3pIxV72sQf8rsMPnO4dRF2nQ?docId=CNG.79d23623538adc9507ec3c37e5062
f1b.251.
4 See id.
5 See infra Part I.
6 See infra Part II.
7 See infra Part III.
8 See infra Part IV, V.
9 See infra Part VI.
10 See infra Part VII.
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between domestic and international law.11 The proposal of amending
Australia’s immigration laws is premised on the idea that domestic
law trumps international obligations.12 This rationale raises concerns
about member states’ obligations under the U.N. Refugee
Convention.
I. THE MALAYSIAN DEAL AND ITS ORIGINS
Australia receives about two percent of the world’s asylum
claims. In 2010, only 8,250 immigrants applied as asylum seekers
within the country.14 By comparison, 55,530 noncitizens sought
asylum in the United States in 2010.15 However, it is not the lack of
asylum seekers that have given rise to this controversy. Because of its
proximity to Burma, Australia has become a popular destination for
immigrants arriving by sea from Southeast Asia.16 Dubbed the “boat
13

11 Scholars have recently addressed Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106
of 2011 in different lights. See Michelle Foster, Reflections on a Decade of International
Law: International Legal Theory: Snapshots From a Decade Of International Legal Life: The
Implications Of the Failed ‘Malaysian Solution’: The Australian High Court and Refugee
Responsibility Sharing At International Law, 13 MELB. J. INT’L L. 395, 422 (2012)
(explaining that, according to the Migration Act as it presently stands, any future
offshore processing arrangement undertaken by Australia must accord with
Australia’s international legal obligations); see also Hannah Stewart-Weeks, Out of
Sight But Not Out of Mind: Plaintiff M61/2010E v. Commonwealth, 33 SYDNEY L.
REV. 831, 843-46 (2011) (arguing that the Migration Act would not necessarily have
to be amended because section 198A(3) provides a way for the Minister to declare a
country safe if it “meets relevant human rights standards in providing protection”).
12 See Katina Curtis, No Deal Yet on Asylum Seekers, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Dec. 23, 2011, http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/nodeal-yet-on-asylum-seekers-20111223-1p7mm.html.
13 See U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY, ASYLUM LEVELS AND TRENDS IN
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 2010 15 (2011),
http://www.unhcr.org/4d8c5b109.html.
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See Tony Keim, Accused People Smugglers’ Boat Stranded at Sea, THE
COURIER-MAIL, Oct. 4, 2011,
http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/national/accused-people-smugglers-boatstranded-at-sea-court-told/story-e6freooo-1226158318125.
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people,” these immigrants have garnered attention both in the media
and within the Australian government.17
Christmas Island, an Australian territory located in the Indian
Ocean, has been designated as an “excised offshore place.”18On this
island, unlawful noncitizens, who have come to Australia via
“offshore entry,” are detained.19 On July 25, 2011, the Australian and
Malaysian governments devised a plan by which 800 asylum seekers,
who had yet to have their claims assessed in Australia, would be sent
to Malaysia for processing.20 The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (“the UNHCR”) would then evaluate
these asylum seekers’ claims in Malaysia.21
The Australian government justified the deal as a valid
exercise of power under sections 198(2) and 198A(1) of the
Migration Act of 1958.22 Section 198(2) provides that an immigration
officer must remove noncitizens who are determined to be unlawfully
present “as soon as reasonably possible,” but does not indicate the
location to which these Asylum seekers should be removed.23 Section
198A further provides that Australia may remove “offshore entry
person[s]” to safe third countries.24 Under this provision, for a
country to be a valid port, it must meet “relevant” human rights

Nick Butterly & Andrew Probyn Canberra, Gillard Turns the Boat Jeat on
Abbott, THE WEST AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 24, 2011,
http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/-/breaking/10329656/gillard-turns-theboat-heat-on-abbott/.
18 See DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, FACT SHEET
81 - AUSTRALIA’S EXCISED OFFSHORE PLACES (2010).
19 See DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 19;
see also Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 5(1) (Austl.) (defining a non-citizen as any
individual who has been determined not to be an Australian citizen and an
“offshore entry person” as a non-citizen who has entered unlawfully at an excised
offshore place).
20 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011, (2011) HCA 32, at
¶ 8; Siegel, supra note 1.
21 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for
Immigration and Citizenship, [2011] HCA 32, at ¶ 8.
22 See id.
23 Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 198(2) (Austl.).
24 Id. § 198A(1).
17
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standards.25 Furthermore, such a third country must also provide
protection to persons seeking asylum or returning to their countries
of origin.26
While on its face the deal represents an outsourcing scheme
to avoid the consumption of government resources, justification for
the deal has been political rather than administrative.27 By refusing to
house asylum seekers within Australia, the government hopes to
deter immigrants from seeking illegal channels of entry.28
While outsourcing refugee processing might appear to be an
uncommon solution, this deal hardly marks the first time Australia
has attempted to implement such a scheme.29 In 2001, a Norwegian
carrier ship, the MV Tampa, rescued 438 distressed Afghans from
fishing vessels in international waters.30 The rescued noncitizens
subsequently sought asylum from the Australian government.31 On
September 10, 2001, Australia’s Minister of Defense and the
President of the Republic of Nauru devised the “Pacific Solution”,
under which the asylum seekers were removed to the Polynesian
island nation to have their claims processed.32

See id.
See id.
27 See Press Release, Australian Human Rights Commission, Sending
Asylum Seekers To Malaysia Is Not The Answer To Addressing People Smuggling
(July 25, 2011),
http://humanrights.gov.au/about/media/media_releases/2011/61_11.html).
28 See id.
29 See Susan Kneebone, The Pacific Plan: The Provision of “Effective
Protection?”, 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 696 (2006); see also Savitri Taylor, Protection
Elsewhere/Nowhere, 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 283 (2006).
30 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 13.
31 See id.
32 See Kneebone, supra note 30, at 696; Taylor, supra note 30 (for a
discussion of Australia’s previous third-country arrangements).
25
26
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II. LEGALITY OF THIRD PARTY SCHEMES UNDER AUSTRALIA’S
MIGRATION ACT
Australian officials have proposed that they can circumvent
Australian law and allow for the third party deal by amending
Australia’s Migration Act.33 An initial question therefore is whether
the deal does in fact violate Australian law.
A 1992 amendment to Australia’s Migration Act established
grounds for the mandatory detention and removal of noncitizens. 34
Under the Migration Act, unlawful noncitizens detained under
section 178 must be kept in immigration detention until they are
removed from Australian borders.35 If the noncitizen is given a final
status determination of unlawful presence, s/he must then be
removed “as soon as reasonably practical.”36
Australia’s Migration Act provides for these asylum seekers to
be sent to territories other than their countries of origin.37 Under
Section 91D of the Migration Act, such plans are designated as “safe
third country” schemes.38 The Minister of Immigration has the ability
to designate a third country as being “safe,” and thus a proper port of
removal.39 An asylum claimant, who has a right to reside in a third
country, cannot validly apply for a visa based on protection in
Australia.40 In addition, Australia would not have any protection
obligations to such an individual.41 Because a third country to which a
person has residence ties will have the obligation of assessing his

See Migration Legislation Amendment (Offshore Processing and Other
Measures) of 2011, (Cth) (Austl.); see also Curtis, supra note 13.
34 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) §§ 188-197 (Austl.).
35 See id. §§ 177-78 (defining a ‘designated person’ who is to be detained).
36 See Plaintiff M61 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, (2010)
85 ALJR 133, 139-140 (Austl.).
37 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 91D (Austl.).
38 See id.
39 See id. § 91D(3).
40 See id. §§ 91C(1)(b)(ii), 91E.
41 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 45 (Austl.).
33
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asylum claim, this provision prevents immigrants from “forum
shopping” for the most lenient admissions system.42
Section 198A of the Migration Act requires that a declaration
be made in relation to the third country to which a migrant will be
sent.43 Australian courts have held that such a declaration must be
made by the Minister of Immigration in “good faith.”44 Furthermore,
any declaration must be based on an objective evaluation that a
designated country is “safe” to send migrants.45 The declaration must
also comport with obligations under the Refugee Convention.46 For a
country to be declared “safe,” migrants must be given protection
both while their claims are being processed and after a final
determination of their claims has been made.47
III. THE HIGH COURT’S RESPONSE TO THE MALAYSIAN DEAL
While Australia’s Migration Act does allow for certain safe
third country schemes,48 the High Court has rejected its use in the
present deal.49 Up until the High Court’s ruling rejecting the
Malaysian deal, Australian courts generally held that the third-party
state need not be a party to the Refugee Convention before a transfer
could take place.50 However, in Plaintiff M70 and M106, the High
Court ruled that Australia must consider the recipient country’s
domestic laws and obligations under international law when declaring

42 Penelope Mathew, Current Development: Australian Refugee Protection in the
Wake of the Tampa, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 661, 672-673 (2002).
43 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 198A(3) (Austl.).
44 See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Eshetu, (1999) 197
CLR 611, 654 (Austl.).
45 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 198A(3) (Austl.) (establishing the
criteria used to evaluate a third country as safe).
46 See id. § 198A(3)(iv).
47 See id. §§ 198A(3)(ii)-(iii).
48 See id. § 91D.
49 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32 at ¶ 66-67.
50 See, e.g., Kola v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,
(2002) 120 FCR 170, 178 (Austl.).
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a country to be “safe.”51 When confronted with the issue of whether
Australia could deport asylum seekers to Malaysia for processing, the
Court held that migrants, who claim a fear of persecution by their
countries of origin, may only be taken from Australia pursuant to
section 198A.52 If no power under section 198A exists, the person
may only be validly removed once their claims are assessed and found
to be lacking.53 If, however, the migrant is ultimately determined to
be a refugee, the person may only be removed pursuant to the nonrefoulement provisions under section 198(2).54
Section 198A requires certain standards to be met before
offshore entry persons may be taken to a designated country.55 A
country of deportation must provide effective procedures for
assessing asylum claims.56 Protections must be afforded to refugees57,
as well as noncitizens who are waiting for their claims to be
processed.58 A third country must also meet “relevant” human rights
standards in dispensing its protection to refugees and asylum
seekers.59
Previous High Court precedent supports the fact that the
government owes a “protection obligation” to those asserting asylum
claims under Article 36, Section 2 of the Migration Act.60 Article 36
states that the criterion for a protection visa in Australia is that “the
applicant for the visa is a noncitizen in Australia to whom Australia
has a protection obligation under [the Convention].”61

51 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 66.
52 See id.
53 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 54.
54 See id. at ¶ 51.
55 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth.) § 198A(3)(a) (Austl.).
56 See id. § 198A(3)(a)(i).
57 See id. § 198A(3)(a)(ii).
58 See id. § 198A(3)(a)(iii).
59 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 198A(3)(a)(vi) (Austl.).
60 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, 213 ALR 668, at ¶ 42 (Austl.).
61 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 36(2) (Austl.).
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In NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the High Court explained the
fundamental difference between those noncitizens who have entered
the country and those who have not.62 Because customary
international law involves rights between states rather than
individuals, an asylum seeker cannot assert a right to enter a country
where an individual is not a national.63 However, Australia’s
Migration Act fills in the gap left by international law. Section 36(2)
assumes that “obligation[s] are owed. . . by Contracting States to
individuals” as well as to other member states.64 Under Section 36(2),
a protection obligation is owed to those who assert an asylum claim.65
An asylum applicant can take himself out of the class of noncitizens
to whom Australia owes a protection obligation under the Migration
Act by committing certain crimes.66 However, simply because a
noncitizen has not had his asylum claim adjudicated does not mean
that no protection obligations exist under Section 36.67 Similarly, in
Plaintiff M61, the Court explained that the Migration Act is premised
on the idea that Australia has a “protection obligation to
individuals.”68 The Court held that the Migration Act is structured in
such a way that the international obligations towards refugees are
mirrored by Australia’s domestic law.69

62 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶ 58.
63 See id.
64 Id. at ¶ 27; see also Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 36(2) (Austl.).
65 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth.) § 36(2) (Austl.); NAGV and NAGW
of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs,
[2005] HCA 6, at ¶ 33.
66 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 91U (Austl.); see also Migration
Reform Act of 1992, (Cth) § 4(b) (Austl.).
67 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶¶ 2, 9 (Austl.).
68 Plaintiff M61 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, (2010) 85
ALJR at 139.
69 Id.
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IV. LEGALITY IN LIGHT OF AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE REFUGEE CONVENTION
In order to be consistent with the principles of the Refugee
Convention, asylum seekers, who turn to foreign governments
because their own countries are unable or unwilling to provide them
with protection,70 should be assured these governments will not in
turn cast them out. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention adopts this
idea of non-refoulement, stating that a contracting state will not
“expel or return” a refugee to a country in which his life or freedom
“would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”71
The principle of non-refoulement has long been espoused as
a necessary protection for asylum seekers.72 On its face, the plain
language of Article 33 prohibits refoulement to a refugee’s country of
origin, which poses a threat to his life or freedom.73 However, the
principle of non-refoulement under Article 33 has subsequently been
extended to include a prohibition against chain refoulement.74 If an
asylum seeker is sent to a third country, it must not, in turn, deport
the noncitizen back to the home from which he is seeking
protection.75 Third countries might likewise be improper if the
noncitizen only temporarily resided in such a country and would
therefore likely be deported for failing to establish residence ties.76
The principle of non-refoulement extends past the Refugee
Convention. The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has indicated
that practices among countries that are widespread enough to
constitute an international custom can be accepted as international
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res.
2198 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/187, at art. 1 (Dec. 18, 2001).
71 See id. at art. 2.
72 See id. at art. 33.
73 See id.
74 Stephen H. Legomsky, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of
Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
PPLA/2003/01 (Feb. 2003).
75 Id.
76 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note
71, at art. 33.
70
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law.77 The United Nations has declared that the principle of nonrefoulement constitutes a rule of international customary law.78
Because of the widespread incorporation of non-refoulement
provisions in regional and worldwide treaties, the UN has asserted
that the principle has come to constitute an international custom as
well as a rule of international law.79 The UNHCR further pointed to
the inclusion of non-refoulement in the reaffirmed 1967 UN
Declaration on Territorial Asylum as evidence that the principle has
risen to the level of international customary law.80
Two types of states exist in regards to non-refoulement
obligations: those countries which are State Parties to the
international human rights treaties; and those states which have not
yet acceded to treaty obligations.81 For State Parties to the Refugee
Convention, there is a delineated obligation under the treaty’s
language to protect asylum seekers from refoulement.82 For states,
which are not parties to either the Refugee Convention or its
protocol, the principle of non-refoulement must nevertheless be
respected because it has attained the status of customary international
law.83 The ICJ has explained that states have an obligation to act in
conformity with customary law on the international stage.84 If a state
deviates from such courses of conduct, it will be treated as being in
breach of such rules, rather than as a forerunner in the creation of a

77 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 33
U.N.T.S. 993, at art. 38, ¶ 1.
78 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, The Principle of NonRefoulement as a Norm of Customary International Law. Response to the Questions Posed to
UNHCR by the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in Cases 2
BvR 1938/93, 2 BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93, Jan. 31, 1994,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/437b6db64.html.
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 79.
84 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 425 (June 27).
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new international standard.85 The state’s action will be considered to
be prima facie evidence that a rule has been violated.86
Australia’s High Court has extended the concept of nonrefoulement to safe third country schemes.87 In NAVG, the Minister
of Immigration argued that the principle of non-refoulement under
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention only protected noncitizens
from deportation to their countries of origin.88 Article 33, therefore,
did not place any limitations on sending noncitizens to countries
other than their homelands.89 The High Court firmly rejected this
reasoning.90 The Court explained that non-refoulement was a broad
enough concept to include protection from asylum seekers being sent
to countries where their lives or freedoms would be threatened.91 The
Court further explained that Article 33 of the Refugee Convention
should also be read in the negative.92 Thus, if a country is “bound by
a non-refoulement obligation” with respect to a given asylum
applicant, and there is no country to which the applicant can be
removed without the obligation being breached, “the State in
question has no choice but to tolerate that individual’s presence
within its territory.”93 Thus, a state might have an obligation to
See id.
See id. at 427.
87 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶ 25.
88 See id. at ¶ 24.
89 See id.
90 See id. at ¶ 91 (“If the Minister’s argument were accepted. . . it would
seem to follow that Australia would never have owed protection obligations to any
person.”).
91 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶ 25; see also U.N. High
Commissioner For Refugees, The Scope And Content of the Principle Of Non-Refoulement,
June 20, 2001,
http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=
3b33574d1 (discussing how third country schemes fall under the auspices of Article
33 of the Convention. Not only does Article 33 require that a State Party consider
whether a claimant’s life and freedom would be threatened, but also the possibility
of chain migration).
92 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶ 23.
93 Id. at ¶ 22.
85
86
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protect a noncitizen simply because no other proper and safe country
exists.94
While Australia must adhere to the Refugee Convention’s
non-refoulement principles, the High Court has held that third
country schemes are not per se prohibited under the terms of the
Convention.95 In Thiyagarajah, a Sri Lankan applicant in Australia had
previously been granted refugee status and permanent residence in
France.96 The respondent was furthermore eligible to apply for
French citizenship.97 The High Court held that, because France
would provide effective protection to the respondent, deporting him
to the third country was consistent with Australia’s obligations under
the Convention.98 The Federal Court subsequently expanded on the
High Court’s reasoning, holding that a safe country could be
designated by an applicant having minimal ties to a territory, such as
being granted a temporary right to re-enter a third country.99
The UNHCR has similarly explained that safe third country
schemes do not represent a violation of a State Party’s obligations
under the Convention.100 The Executive Committee of the UNHCR
has conceded that if an asylum seeker has preexisting “connection[s]
or close links” with another state, deportation to that country might
be allowed.101 The appropriateness of this deportation, however, is
dependent on whether it is “fair and reasonable” to expect the
applicant to first request asylum from the third country.102

See id.
See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Thiyagarajah,
(1997) 80 FCR 543, 563 (Austl.).
96 See id. at 565.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 563.
99 See Rajendran v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,
1998 AUST FEDCT LEXIS 651, ¶ 11 (Austl.).
100 See U.N. Human Right Commission, Refugees Without an Asylum
Country, Conclusion No. 15 (XXX), (A/34/12/Add.1) (Oct. 16, 1979) [hereinafter
Refugees Without an Asylum Country].
101 Id.
102 See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Thiyagaraja,
(1997) 80 FCR at 563.
94
95
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V. EFFECTIVE PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Australian courts have clearly interpreted the Convention to
allow for the deportation of noncitizens who have valid claims to
asylum.103 However, previous case law indicates that a third country
must be able to provide an asylum seeker with effective protection.104
The High Court in Thiyagarajah ultimately held that France was a
proper third country to which the noncitizen could be deported
without a substantive consideration of his asylum claim.105 But, the
determining factor in the case was not only that the respondent had
previously been granted status in France, but also that the third
country would provide him with effective protection.106 The High
Court affirmed the reasoning of the Full Court when it noted that it
was highly unlikely that the applicant would be in danger of chain
refoulement if deported to France.107
Effective protection is a safeguard designed to protect not
only noncitizens who have already been granted asylum but also
applicants who assert asylum claims.108 Claiming a credible fear from
a country of origin affords an applicant with certain minimum
safeguards while their claims are being adjudicated.109 The means by
which these safeguards are provided are left open by the terms of the
Refugee Convention.110 The UNHCR has acknowledged that varying
See id.
See generally Rajendran v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs, (1998) 86 FCR 526 (Austl.).
105 See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Thiyagaraja,
(1997) 80 FCR at 563.
106 See id.
107 See id.; see generally Rajendran v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, (1998) 86 FCR 526 (Austl.).
108 See U.N. Refugee Agency, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial
Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, at 2-3 (Jan. 26, 2007),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/45f17a1a4.pdf.
109 See id.
110 See U.N. Human Right Commission, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, line 191, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV (1992) [hereinafter Handbook
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees].
103
104
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methods of adjudicating claims, including integrating the processing
of asylum claims into the general immigration system, might
nevertheless be in line with a country’s obligations under the Refugee
Convention.111
While each State Party is given leave to implement its own
procedures for adjudicating claims based on its particular judicial and
administrative structure,112 the UNHCR has nevertheless
promulgated minimum procedural standards which must be met.113
The Executive Committee of UNHCR has explained that “fair and
effective protection” includes procedures minimally sufficient to
allow for the identification of noncitizens that should benefit from
protection under the terms of the Refugee Convention.114 For
example, it is not sufficient to designate a third country as “safe”
based solely on whether that country is a State Party to the Refugee
Convention.115 Instead, a hallmark of effective protection is whether
a third country’s asylum processing system is fair to applicants.116 The
U.N.’s General Counsel has recommended that a fair system of
asylum adjudication must include a determination of claims by an
impartial authority and an effective system of appeal.117
At the twenty-eighth session of the High Commissioner’s
Programme in October, 1977, the Executive Committee delineated
certain minimum procedural requirements that would constitute
effective protection of asylum applicants.118 Asylum seekers should
first and foremost be given necessary information about the
procedures they need to follow to assert asylum claims.119 Interpreters
should be provided to applicants while they are submitting their
See id.
See id.
113 See Refugees Without an Asylum Country, supra note 101, at 2.
114 See id.
115 See Legomsky, supra note 75, at 7.
116 See Refugees Without an Asylum Country, supra note 101.
117 See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 111,
at line 192.
118 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Determination of Refugee
Status, No. 8 (XXVIII), A/32/12/Add.1 (Oct. 12, 1977).
119 See id. at e(ii).
111
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claims to the appropriate officials.120 While countries often do not
recognize the right of an applicant to have appointed counsel,
noncitizens seeking asylum should nevertheless be granted an
adequate opportunity to obtain counsel.121 Finally, while an
applicant’s claim is pending an initial determination or appeal, the
asylum seeker should not be removed from the country from which
he is seeking protection.122
Under best practice procedures, a determination of whether a
country is “safe” and will provide asylum seekers effective protection
should be individualized.123 An examination should be conducted by
a state to determine whether the third country would not apply more
restrictive criteria in adjudicating a particular claim than the country
the applicant is already in.124 The Executive Committee of the
UNHCR has acknowledged that the prevailing legal standard among
countries places the burden of proof in establishing asylum on the
noncitizen submitting the claim.125 However, asylum applicants rarely
flee their homelands carrying documentation of their persecution.126
Given that the sole evidence for many applicants will be their own
testimony, the Executive Committee has explained that the duty to
ascertain all relevant facts is shared between an applicant and
See id. at e(iv).
See id.
122 See id. at e(vii).
123 See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 111,
at line 29; see also Joanne van Selm, Access to Procedures ‘Safe Third Countries’, ‘Safe
Countries
of
Origin’
and
‘Time
Limits’,
UNHCR,
June
2001,
http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=
3b39a2403 (discussing how countries are classified as safe under the human rights
obligations of the European Union).
124 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Asylum Processes (Fair
and Efficient Asylum Procedures), ¶ 4, EC/GC/01/12 (May 31, 2001).
125 See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 111,
at line 196.
126 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Annotations for
Articles 1 to 19 of the Draft Council Directive on Minimum Standards for the Qualification of
Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need
International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, Dec. 2002, at 6,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/437cafaa4.html.
120
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government examiners.127 For a country to have effective procedural
protections, the system of adjudicating claims must take into account
and make allowances for unsupported yet credible statements by
applicants.128
The UNHCR does not stand alone in its emphasis on the
effective processing of asylum claims. The ICJ has similarly linked the
principle of non-refoulement to a third country having an adequate
system of adjudicating asylum claims.129 In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,
a noncitizen claiming asylum from Afghanistan entered the European
Union through Greece.130 The Afghani finally made his way to
Belgium, where he was detained.131 He was then transferred back to
Greece to have his asylum claim processed.132 The Grand Chamber
of the European Court of Human Rights held that Belgium breached
its obligation of non-refoulement under Article 3 of the European
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“ECHR”).133 The court emphasized that shortcomings in
a third country’s system of processing asylum claims alone could
violate a deporting state’s international obligations of nonrefoulement.134 The court explained that Belgium “knew or ought to
have known” that the noncitizen, when deported to Greece, had “no
guarantee that his asylum application would be seriously examined by
the Greek authorities.”135 In designating Greece as an improper third
country, the court pointed to deficiencies in the Greek system of
processing asylum claims, including claimants not receiving adequate
127 See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 111,
at line 196.
128 See id.
129 See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09, Eur. Ct.
H.R., 4 (2011), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d39bc7f2.html.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See id. at 84 (2011).
134 See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09, Eur. Ct.
H.R., 75 (2011).
135 Id. at 75; See also DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT:
GREECE, 14(2010)(discussing the refugee protection system in Greece. Greece’s
asylum system has been characterized as “gravely dysfunctional” in its identification
of individuals seeking asylum and its processing of claims.).
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information from Greek officials, a shortage of interpreters, and
claimants not being given sufficient opportunity to secure legal aid.136
Because of backlogs in the Greek asylum processing system,
excessive delays in both initial asylum determinations and subsequent
appeals were further indicated as negative factors in Greece’s
immigration system.137
VI. MALAYSIA’S TREATMENT OF REFUGEES
International standards and safeguards indicate that a third
country will be considered improper based on deficiencies in its
processing of asylum claims alone.138 For Malaysia to therefore
constitute a proper third country, standards of protection articulated
by the international community must be met.139 In order to determine
whether Malaysia would constitute an effective third country, it is
necessary to examine Malaysia’s system of processing asylum claims,
as well as its treatment of asylum seekers.
One of the initial and resounding objections by the media to
the Malaysian deal was that Malaysia had yet to become a member of
the Refugee Convention.140 Being a member of the Convention does
not simply mean that a country acknowledges the need to uphold
human rights standards for those seeking asylum.141 The UNHCR
also casts a net of supervision142 over the member states.143 The
regulations put in place by the Convention were designed to provide
a uniform system of asylum protection and adjudication between

See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09, Eur. Ct.
H.R., 111 (2011).
137 See id. at 39.
138 See id. at 75.
139 See id.
140 See British Broadcasting Corporation, supra note 2; see also Ja & Drape,
supra note 2.
141 See Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra
note 71, at 2.
142 See id. at 4.
143 See Michelle Foster, Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring
Refugees To Seek Protection in Another State, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 223, 283 (2007).
136
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member states.144In fact, the concept of safe third countries
originated as a way for member states with common protection
obligations to share the burden of processing asylum claims.145
Because Malaysia is not a State Party to the Refugee
Convention, it does not have an obligation to comply with the
minimum protections listed in the treaty as would a member state.146
Moreover, the country does not legally recognize the status of
“refugee” under its domestic laws.147 The UNHCR has indicated that
the country does not have any “constitutional, legislative or
administrative provisions dealing with the right to seek asylum or the
protection of refugees.”148 This lack of legal recognition means that a
system has not been established for providing protection for the
specific processing and protection needs of refugees.149 No
protection is provided for noncitizens that are ultimately determined
to be unlawful and expelled to their countries of origin.150
Under Malaysian law, anyone entering the country without
appropriate documentation is subject to mandatory imprisonment for
a maximum period of five years and a fine not exceeding RM10,000
(approximately $3,000 USD).151 Under Section 6 of Malaysia’s
Immigration Act of 1959/63, an unlawful noncitizen is also subject
See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 117 (“What is clear is that
signatories to the Refugees Convention and the Refugees Protocol are bound to
accord to those who have been determined to be refugees the rights that are
specified in those instruments including the rights earlier described.”).
145 See id. at ¶ 19.
146 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, States Parties to the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, Apr.
2011,http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html.
147 See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: MALAYSIA, 27
(2010).
148 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR’s Views On The
Concept of Effective Protection As It Relates To Malaysia, Mar. 2005, at 1,
http://www.unhcr.org.au/pdfs/Malaysia.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR’s Views On The
Concept of Effective Protection As It Relates To Malaysia].
149 See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: MALAYSIA, at
27 (2010) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: MALAYSIA].
150 See id. at 28.
151 See Immigration Act 1959/63, § 6(3)(Malaysia).
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to whipping of not more than six strokes.152 Since the Malaysian
Immigration Act was amended in 2002, the Malaysian government
reported in June 2009 that 47,914 noncitizens had been subjected to
physical punishment for immigration offenses.153 Amnesty
International has similarly estimated that as many as 10,000
immigrant prisoners are caned in the country annually.154
In some ways, the Malaysian government has not been blind
to the holes existing in its immigration policy. The UNHCR has
noted that Malaysia has shown a “considerable degree of
cooperation” with UNHCR officials.155 The country has not impeded
humanitarian organizations that enter the country and provide
assistance to the refugee population.156 Those already granted refugee
status by the UNHCR are not deported and are generally given
preferential treatment in detention centers.157 Likewise, those with
UNHCR cards were given access to health care and limited access to
NGO clinics.158 The country, however, does not provide access to
formal education, even to noncitizens with UNHCR cards.159
Yet, this situational compliance does not alleviate the broader
and deeper problems in Malaysia’s refugee policy. In the Annual
World Refugee Survey, the UNHCR characterized Malaysia’s refugee
processing as a system comprised of “arbitrary arrest[s], detention[s]
and deportation[s]” of refugees.160 Malaysia’s immigration system
furthermore does not seem to take into account the danger of chain
refoulement.161 The UNHCR noted that during 2008, Malaysia

See id.
See HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: MALAYSIA, supra note 150, at 26.
154 See AMNESTY INT’L, A BLOW TO HUMANITY—TORTURE BY JUDICIAL
CANING IN MALAYSIA 5 (2010).
155 UNHCR’s Views On The Concept of Effective Protection As It Relates To
Malaysia, supra note 149, at 1.
156 See HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: MALAYSIA, supra note 150, at 27.
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See id. at 28.
160 U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey
2009 – Malaysia, June 17, 2009,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a40d2adc.html.
161 See id.
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deported at least 1,000 asylum seekers to Thailand, which has been
known to refoule noncitizens to Myanmar.162
Malaysia’s adjudication of asylum claims has been criticized as
including inconsistencies and corruption. In the 2008 Annual World
Refugee Survey, the UNHCR described how authorities in
immigration holding facilities do not permit detainees to make phone
calls upon their arrest.163 In order to inform anyone of their arrest or
to seek aid, the detainees generally had to bribe police officers.164
Malaysia also has a history of not following the letter of its
international obligations.165 Despite Malaysia being a State Party to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the country does not
provide primary education opportunities or free health services to
most asylum seeking children.166 The UNHCR has further observed
that the country has failed to consistently implement political
decisions, specific laws and regulations or even oral agreements with
the UNHCR to establish a system of refugee protection and
evaluation.167
Malaysia’s deficiencies in asylum processing act as a
counterexample to what the international community characterizes as
a safe third country. Similar to the International Court of Justice’s
reasoning in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece that a third country was
improper because there was no guarantee that asylum applications
would be considered fairly and properly due to processing
deficiencies,168 the failure of the Malaysian system to protect against
the dangers of internal corruption and chain refoulement suggest that
Malaysia would not be a proper third country.169 Furthermore, similar
to the reasoning of the UNHCR that hallmarks of a safe third
country include applicants being given information about their
See id.
See id.
164 See id.
165 See World Refugee Survey 2009 – Malaysia, supra note 161.
166 See id.
167 See UNHCR’s Views On The Concept of Effective Protection As It Relates To
Malaysia, supra note 149, at 1.
168 See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09, _Eur. Ct. H.R.
at 84.
169 See World Refugee Survey 2009 – Malaysia, supra note 161.
162
163
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process and access to a fair and impartial system of asylum
determination and appeal,170 reports indicating that detainees must
resort to bribery to gain access to outside resources intimate that
Malaysia lacks the internal system needed to meet international
standards.171
VII. CAN DOMESTIC REGULATIONS TRUMP INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS?
Australia’s Constitution dictates that treaty ratification is the
function of the Commonwealth Executive,172 while the passage of
laws affecting the Commonwealth is a function of the
Commonwealth Parliament.173 Because of this separation of powers,
a treaty is not incorporated into domestic law unless it is
implemented by legislation.174 This concept has traditionally been
known as dualism.175 A dualist system requires international laws to
be translated to domestic regulations in order to take effect.176
Without such execution, litigants would have no cognizable claim in
national courts based on international provisions.177
In the vast majority of cases, statutory construction
circumvents problems related to incorporation.178 It is
uncontroverted that a country has the sovereign power to determine
the means by which international agreements are implemented

See Refugees Without an Asylum Country, supra note 101.
See World Refugee Survey 2009 – Malaysia, supra note 161.
172 See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION § 61; see also Department of Foreign
Affairs
and
Trade,
Treaties
and
Treaty
Making
(2011),
http://www.dfat.gov.au/treaties/making/making2.html.
173 See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION § 1.
174 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, supra note 173.
175 See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy
Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 323; see also Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The
Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 628 (2007).
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See generally Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh,
(1995) 183 CLR at 273, 32 ALD 420 (Austl.).
170
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domestically.179 The principle that ambiguities in legislation should be
construed in accordance with treaty obligations circumvents the
majority of conflicts between the international and domestic fields. 180
However, under a system that requires incorporation for treaty
provisions to take on the force of law, it is theoretically possible to
change the direct obligations which a treaty would impose by
amending Australian domestic law.
Just such an amendment was proposed after the High Court
ruled against the Malaysian deal.181 On September 21, 2011, a bill to
amend the Migration Act of 1958 was introduced in the Australian
House of Representatives.182 The purpose of this bill was to “replace
the existing framework in the Migration Act for taking offshore entry
persons to another country.”183 The bill called for the repeal of
section 198A, the basis for the High Court’s 2011 ruling against the
Malaysia deal.184 In place of this component, a new section would
provide that “the designation of a country to be an offshore
processing country need not be determined by reference to the
international obligations or domestic law of that country.”185
The proposed amendment to the Migration Act would
circumvent the specific ruling of the High Court which disallowed
the Malaysian deal.186 However, case law indicates that despite this
incorporation requirement, treaties still impose some indirect
179 See id.; Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth, (1998) 195 CLR 337, 384
(Austl.); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976) (“Where not already
provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt
such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.”).
180 See generally Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh,
(1995) 183 CLR at 273.
181 See Migration Legislation Amendment (Offshore Processing and
Other Measures) of 2011, (Cth)(Austl.).
182 See id.
183 Id. at 2.
184 See id. at 17.
185 Id.
186 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, supra note 173.
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obligations absent being implemented by legislation.187 In Minister for
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, a Malaysian immigrant was
ordered deported after being convicted of possessing heroin.188 The
Federal Court held that the deportation order had been improperly
issued because of a failure to consider the hardship to Teoh’s wife
and her children if Teoh was refused legal status.189 On review, the
High Court affirmed the Federal Court’s decision, reasoning that the
Convention on the Rights of the Child required the hardship suffered
by the children to be considered.190 The High Court’s reasoning can
be applied not only to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, but
also to other treaties to which Australia is a State Party. 191 The High
Court reasoned that, while international agreements must be
incorporated into domestic law to have effect, ratification alone holds
significance.192 The High Court held that Australia’s ratification of an
international agreement raised a “legitimate expectation” that the
standards set forth in the treaty would be followed.193 Absent a
“statutory or executive indication to the contrary,” the obligations
and rights annunciated in treaties are treated as directives on
government policy.194
Teoh contains no reference to what would constitute adequate
“statutory or executive indication to the contrary.” Here, subsequent
Australian case law is instructive. In Tien v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, the Court interpreted sufficient “indications to
the contrary” to refer to statements made at the time a treaty is
entered into, “rather than to statements made years after the treaty
came into force.”195 Take the case of Baldini v. Minister for Immigration

187

See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, (1995) 183

CLR at 293.
188
189
190
191
192

See id. at 279.
See id. at 281.
See id. at 293.
See id. at 301.
See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, (1995) 183

CLR at 301.
See id. at 275-76.
See id. at 274.
195 Tien v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (1998) 53
ALD 32 (Aust.).
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and Multicultural Affairs as a counter-example.196 In this case, a
Ministerial Direction under s 499 of the Migration Act of 1958 was at
issue.197 The Ministerial Directions indicate that the best interest of a
child should be taken into account only in cases involving parental
relationships.198 These Directions provide a narrower best interest
analysis than provided for under the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.199 Nevertheless, the Court found that the Ministerial Direction
provided sufficient “executive indication to the contrary.”200 The
take-away from post-Teoh interpretations of “statutory or executive
indication to the contrary” is that such indication must be clear and
must exist at the time that international obligations are reduced to
domestic law.
Recent years have seen a retreat from the ruling in Teoh. Only
a few short weeks after Teoh’s ruling, Australia’s then-existing
Attorney General and Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a joint
statement denouncing the High Court’s reasoning that
unincorporated treaties impose a “legitimate expectation” under
domestic law.201 What followed included not only multiple attempts
to overturn the decision in the Australian Parliament, but also a
retreat by the High Court itself from its language in Teoh.202 In Ex
196 See Baldini v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,
(2000) FCA 173, ¶ 4; see also Wendy Lacey, In the Wake of Teoh: Finding Appropriate
Government Response, 29 Fed. L. Rev. 219 (2001) (for a discussion of Baldini and its
impact on post-Teoh legislation).
197 See Baldini v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,
(2000) FCA 173, ¶ 4.
198 See id.
199 See id at ¶ 30.
200 See id.
201 See Joint Statement from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the
Attorney General, International Treaties and the High Court Decision in Teoh, May 10,
1995; Joint Statement from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Attorney
General and Minister for Justice, The Effect of Treaties in Administrative DecisionMaking, Feb. 25, 1997.
202 See The Administrative Decisions (Effect of International
Instruments) Bill of 1995, (Cth)(Austl.); Administrative Decisions (Effect of
International Instruments) Bill of 1997, (Cth)(Austl.); Administrative Decisions
(Effect of International Instruments) Bill of 1999, (Cth) (Austl.); See also
Administrative Decision (Effect of International Instruments) Act of 1996 (SA)
(Austl.) (Southern Australia, as opposed to the Commonwealth, has enacted
legislation which invalidates Teoh’s language).
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parte Lam, a noncitizen who had established a family in Australia was
subject to deportability based on a number of criminal convictions.203
Based on the precedent in Teoh, it appeared that there was a
“legitimate expectation” that the best interests of the children who
would be left behind should be taken into account to comport with
Australia’s treaty obligations.204 The High Court, however, expressed
reservations about the language in Teoh.205 The notion was reiterated
that, in the Australian system, treaty obligations that have not been
enacted by legislation are not self-executing.206 The High Court
suggested that Teoh might represent an incompatibility to this
principle.207 Teoh’s continued significance, the High Court suggested,
would depend on the limitations that are to be placed on the case’s
language and on “the basis upon which Teoh rests.”208
Despite a retreat at both the political and judicial levels, Teoh
still represents good law in the Commonwealth.209 Furthermore,
decisions by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal indicate that lower
courts continue to follow the High Court’s reasoning in Teoh.210 In
Yad Ram v. Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, the Tribunal
reviewed the denial of an application for a spousal visa.211 The
Tribunal applied Teoh and found that the spousal visa should be
issued based on the best interests of a child who would be affected
by the decision.212 While Teoh remains contentious within Australia,
standards annunciated by the international community bolster the

See In re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte
Lam, (2003) 214 CLR 1 (Austl.).
204 See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, (1995) 183
CLR at 291.
205 See In re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte
Lam, (2003) 214 CLR 1 (Austl.).
206 See id.
207 See id.
208 See id.
209 See MATTHEW GROVES & H. P. LEE, AUSTRALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: FUNDAMENTALS, PRINCIPLES, AND DOCTRINES 306 (2007).
210 See Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Ram, (1996) 69
FCR 431, 432 (Austl.).
211 See id. at 432.
212 See id. at 436.
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High Court’s decision.213 The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties indicates that a country’s domestic laws cannot provide a
justification for an international treaty violation.214 The International
Law Commission of the United Nations has further indicated that a
country’s legislation being deemed ‘wrongful’ is governed by
international law.215 This character of “wrongfulness” is not affected
if a law is deemed proper within a country.216
The continued existence of Teoh indicates that amending
Australia’s domestic refugee law would not be an effective means to
circumvent obligations under the Refugee Convention. As the High
Court in Teoh indicated, while an amendment to the refugee
processing system can properly alter the means by which asylum
claims are adjudicated, the ends which result from the process must
nevertheless comport with the standards and obligations delineated in
the Refugee Convention.217 Furthermore, international standards
delineated by such instruments as the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties appear to specifically address and prohibit nations from
circumventing their international obligations by changing their
internal laws.218 The weight of such standards indicates that any
amendment designed to allow for an improper third party deal will be
in violation of Australia’s international obligations. While altering the
Migration Act would overcome the immediate blockade by
213 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”).
214 See id.
215 See International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 3, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10)
at 1, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (“[t]he characterization of an act of a State as
internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is
not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.”); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111 cmt. a (1987) (“[F]ailure of the United States to carry out an
obligation [of international law] on the ground of its unconstitutionality will not
relieve the United States of responsibility under international law.”).
216 See id.
217 See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, (1995) 183
CLR at 289.
218 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 214, at art.
27.
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overturning the High Court’s 2011 ruling, international standards
indicate that Australia would still violate its obligations under the
Refugee Convention.
CONCLUSION
An amendment to Australia’s Migration Act is not an antidote
to the Malaysian deal. While amending Section 198A of the Migration
Act has the effect of overturning the discrete High Court ruling
declaring the Malaysian deal improper, Australia’s international
obligations remain.
Certain questions remain unanswered. The conclusions of
this comment are based on the continued vitality of the High Court’s
holding in Teoh that Australia’s ratification of an international treaty,
in the absence of statutory or executive indication to the contrary,
raises a “legitimate expectation” that the standards set forth in the
treaty will be followed.219While Teoh still stands as good law in the
Commonwealth, the High Court’s language in Lam and the
Executive’s issuance of a statement denouncing Teoh, leave the
“legitimate expectation” standard on shaky grounds.220
Further, only the shortcomings in third party schemes have
been addressed. It has been argued that a country such as Malaysia,
which is not a State Party to the Refugee Convention and whose
system of immigration processing is riddled with problems, cannot
constitute a proper third country. While this comment has suggested
that certain standards of asylum processing might bring a country up
to international standards of human rights, a discussion of what
would generally be considered a safe third country is beyond the
scope of this discussion.
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CLR at 289.
See The Administrative Decisions (Effect of International
Instruments) Bill of 1995, (Cth)(Austl.); Administrative Decisions (Effect of
International Instruments) Bill of 1997, (Cth)(Austl.); Administrative Decisions
(Effect of International Instruments) Bill of 1999, (Cth)(Austl).
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The Refugee Convention emphasizes that its State Parties are
sovereign states which are nevertheless part of an international
community.221 While the means by which protection is provided to
refugees is the province of domestic law, to determine the ends that
are ultimately met a member state must look outwards to its role as
an actor on the international stage.

See UNHCR, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol: Signing On Could Make All The Difference, UN REFUGEE AGENCY (Aug.
2001), http://www.unhcr.org/3bbdb0954.html.
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